Tag Archives: OpenID

OpenID and SSL/DNS poisoning

Ben Laurie of Google’s Applied Security team, while working with an external researcher, Dr. Richard Clayton of the Computer Laboratory, Cambridge University, found that various OpenID Providers (OPs) had TLS Server Certificates that used weak keys, as a result of the Debian Predictable Random Number Generator (CVE-2008-0166).

In combination with the DNS Cache Poisoning issue (CVE-2008-1447) and the fact that almost all SSL/TLS implementations do not consult CRLs (currently an untracked issue), this means that it is impossible to rely on these OPs.

In order to mount an attack against a vulnerable OP, the attacker first finds the private key corresponding to the weak TLS certificate. He then sets up a website masquerading as the original OP, both for the OpenID protocol and also for HTTP/HTTPS.

Then he poisons the DNS cache of the victim to make it appear that his server is the true OpenID Provider.

There are two cases, one is where the victim is a user trying to identify themselves, in which case, even if they use HTTPS to “ensure” that the site they are visiting is indeed their provider, they will be unable to detect the substitution and will give their login credentials to the attacker.

The second case is where the victim is the Relying Party (RP). In this case, even if the RP uses TLS to connect to the OP, as is recommended for higher assurance, he will not be defended, as the vast majority of OpenID implementations do not check CRLs, and will, therefore, accept the malicious site as the true OP.